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We granted Appellant Jay Goldstein’s petition for 
rehearing to address the effect of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision in Carpenter v. United States1 on our prior panel 
decision, United States v. Stimler.2  In Stimler, we held that 
the District Court properly denied Goldstein’s motion to 
suppress his cell site location information (CSLI) because 
Goldstein had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his 
CSLI, and, therefore, the government did not need probable 
cause to collect this data.3  Carpenter sets forth a new rule 
that defendants do in fact have a privacy interest in their 
CSLI, and the government must generally obtain a search 
warrant supported by probable cause to obtain this 
information.4  However, we still affirm the District Court’s 
decision under the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule because the government had an objectively reasonable 
good faith belief that its conduct was legal when it acquired 




 We recited a comprehensive factual background in our 
previous decision.5  The facts relevant to this decision follow.  
                                              
1 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).  
2 864 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2017).   
3 Id. at 263.  Carpenter does not affect our other holdings in 
Stimler.  Those remain as written and are not addressed in or 
changed by this decision. 
4 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2222.  
5 Stimler, 864 F.3d at 259-61.  
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Goldstein was arrested for his involvement in a kidnapping 
scheme.  Hoping to find evidence placing Goldstein at the 
scene of the kidnapping, the prosecutors obtained a court 
order under the Stored Communications Act (SCA)—
specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)—compelling Goldstein’s 
cell phone carrier to turn over 57 days’ worth of his CSLI.  
CSLI is a type of metadata that is generated every time a 
user’s cell phone connects to the nearest antenna.  The user’s 
cell phone service provider retains a time-stamped record 
identifying the particular antenna to which the phone 
connected.  Because most people constantly carry and 
frequently use their cell phones, CSLI can provide a detailed 
log of an individual’s movements over a period of time.   
 
The legal question in this case centers on whether 
Section 2703(d), the statutory provision under which the 
government obtained Goldstein’s CSLI, complies with the 
Fourth Amendment.  The Fourth Amendment protects against 
unreasonable searches.  In order for the acquisition of CSLI to 
be a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, an individual 
must have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his CSLI.6  
In order for a search to be “reasonable,” it generally must be 
conducted pursuant to a search warrant supported by probable 
cause, unless an exception to the warrant requirement 
applies.7  Consequently, if there is no reasonable expectation 
of privacy as to CSLI, then its acquisition does not require a 
search warrant; if there is, then a warrant is generally 
required.  Section 2703(d) does not require a showing of 
                                              
6 See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) 
(explaining what constitutes a reasonable expectation of 
privacy).  
7 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014). 
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probable cause to obtain CSLI.  Rather, it calls for a more 
lenient standard, requiring “specific and articulable facts 
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the 
CSLI is relevant and material.8   
 
Before trial, Goldstein moved to suppress the CSLI, 
arguing that this provision violates the Fourth Amendment 
because it authorizes disclosure of CSLI without a warrant 
supported by probable cause.  The District Court rejected this 
argument and denied the motion.  Through the testimony of 
an FBI agent, the government introduced the CSLI at trial, 
which placed him in the vicinity of the kidnapping site.  
Goldstein was convicted and sentenced to 96 months in 
prison.    
 
In our previous decision, we affirmed the District 
Court’s denial of Goldstein’s motion to suppress, holding that 
Section 2703(d) complied with the Fourth Amendment 
because cell phone users have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in their CSLI.9   We relied on our decision in In re 
Application of the United States for an Order Directing a 
Provider of Electronic Communication Service to Disclose 
Records to the Government (In re Application),10 which also 
found no reasonable expectation of privacy in CSLI,11 and we 
                                              
8 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d).  
9 Stimler, 864 F.3d at 263.  
10 620 F.3d 304 (3d Cir. 2010).  
11 Id. at 312-13 (holding that CSLI is obtainable without “the 
traditional probable cause determination” because 
individuals’ privacy interests do not extend to CSLI).  
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reasoned that there were no intervening changes in law 
undermining In re Application.12  
 
Goldstein petitioned for rehearing, and we held the 
petition curia advisari vult pending the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Carpenter, which was set to address essentially 
the same question we answered in Stimler:  whether obtaining 
CSLI without a warrant supported by probable cause under 
Section 2703(d) violates the Fourth Amendment’s protection 
against unreasonable searches.  The Supreme Court decided 
Carpenter, and we granted Goldstein’s petition for panel 
rehearing.13  Carpenter came to the opposite conclusion that 
we came to in In re Application and Stimler and held that “an 
individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the 
record of his physical movements as captured though CSLI” 
and that the government’s collection of CSLI requires a 
showing of probable cause under the Fourth Amendment.14  
Consequently, Section 2703(d) may not be used to access 
CSLI because it requires less than probable cause.  
 
Applying Carpenter to Goldstein’s case, we find that 
the government did violate Goldstein’s Fourth Amendment 
rights when it acquired his CSLI under Section 2703(d) of the 
SCA.  However, we will still affirm the District Court’s 
admission of Goldstein’s CSLI because the government was 
acting under an objectively reasonable good faith belief that 
                                              
12 Stimler, 864 F.3d at 264-67. 
13 Appellants Stimler and Epstein also petitioned for 
rehearing, but we denied those petitions because the 
government did not collect their CSLI.  
14 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2222. 
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obtaining CSLI under Section 2703(d) was constitutional at 





It is clear that under Carpenter, acquiring Goldstein’s 
CSLI was an unconstitutional search under the Fourth 
Amendment because the government did not obtain a warrant 
supported by probable cause.16   However, evidence obtained 
in violation of a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is not 
automatically suppressed.  Evidence will be suppressed under 
the exclusionary rule when suppression would further the 
exclusionary rule’s primary objective:  to deter Fourth 
Amendment violations.17  One instance where suppressing 
evidence will not encourage deterrence is where the 
government acted “upon an objectively reasonable good faith 
belief in the legality of [its] conduct” when conducting a 
                                              
15 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  “In 
reviewing a motion to suppress, ‘we review a district court’s 
factual findings for clear error, and we exercise de novo 
review over its application of the law to those factual 
findings.’”  United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 169 n.4 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Pavulak, 700 
F.3d 651, 660 (3d Cir. 2012)).  
16 A warrantless search is still reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment if an exception to the warrant requirement 
applies, but the parties do not argue, and we do not find, that 
any exception applies here.  Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2222-23.  
17 Katzin, 769 F.3d at 170-71.  
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search.18  Indeed, “applying the exclusionary rule would not 
‘yield appreciable deterrence’” when government actors have 
a reasonable belief that their conduct conforms with the law.19  
This is known as the good faith exception, and where it 
applies, the illegally-obtained evidence will not be suppressed 
under the exclusionary rule.  
 
 The Supreme Court has applied this exception across a 
number of cases where suppressing evidence would not have 
any deterrent value—three of which are relevant here.  In 
Illinois v. Krull,20 the Court held that the good faith exception 
applies when a search is executed pursuant to a statute that 
was valid at the time of the search but later declared 
unconstitutional.21  Except in instances where a statute is 
obviously unconstitutional, suppressing evidence obtained by 
a law enforcement officer “acting in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a statute would have . . . little deterrent effect on 
the [government’s] actions.”22  Under Davis v. United 
States,23 this exception also applies when a search is 
conducted based upon reasonable reliance on then-binding 
appellate precedent because exclusion in this context would 
not deter improper government conduct.24  And under United 
                                              
18 Id. at 182.  
19 United States v. Vasquez-Algarin, 821 F.3d 467, 482-83 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237 
(2011)). 
20 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
21 Id. at 349-50.  
22 Id.  
23 564 U.S. 229 (2011).  
24 Id. at 241. 
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States v. Leon,25 the exclusionary rule will not apply when 
law enforcement conducts a search pursuant to a judicial 
order later found invalid.26  
 
 The good faith exception applies to the government’s 
search in this case because the government acted upon an 
objectively reasonable, good faith belief that obtaining 
Goldstein’s CSLI under Section 2703(d) was legal.  At the 
time the search was executed, it was authorized under Section 
2703(d).  The government complied with all requirements of 
Section 2703(d) and obtained a valid judicial order to collect 
Goldstein’s CSLI.  Moreover, the government had no reason 
to question the constitutionality of obtaining CSLI through 
Section 2703(d) because that question had been answered by 
this Court in In re Application—which was binding appellate 
precedent.27  Thus, because the government relied on a 
properly-obtained valid judicial order, a then-valid statute, 
and then-binding appellate authority, it had an objectively 
reasonable, good faith belief that its conduct was legal.  
Indeed, the conduct was legal at the time.  Excluding 
evidence obtained through methods that complied with the 
law at the time of the search cannot serve any deterrent 
purpose.  Under Krull, Davis, and Leon, the good faith 
exception applies, and the District Court’s denial of the 
motion to suppress is affirmed.  Our holding puts us in good 
company, as many of our sister circuits have also found that 
                                              
25 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
26 Id. at 922.  
27 In re Application, 620 F.3d at 313 (“[W]e hold that CSLI 
from cell phone calls is obtainable under a § 2703(d) order 
and that such an order does not require the traditional 
probable cause determination.”). 
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the good faith exception applies when the government 
obtained CLSI data without a warrant prior to Carpenter.28   
 Goldstein contends that the good faith exception does 
not apply because the government’s reliance on Section 
2703(d) was unreasonable for two reasons, both of which fail.  
First, he argues that, at the time of the search, the Eleventh 
Circuit had held that collecting CSLI without a warrant 
supported by probable cause violated the Fourth 
                                              
28 See, e.g., United States v. Joyner, 899 F.3d 1199, 1204-05 
(11th Cir. 2018) (“Here, the Government complied with the 
requirements of the SCA in obtaining the orders to compel 
cell site records, and when they did so in June 2015, that 
warrantless procedure was, under this Court’s precedent, 
within the bounds of the Fourth Amendment.”); 
United States v. Chavez, 894 F.3d 593, 608 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(Carpenter does not affect cases where investigators acted 
pursuant to court orders and the SCA); United States v. 
Curtis, 901 F.3d 846, 849 (7th Cir. 2018) (“We conclude, 
therefore, that even though it is now established that the 
Fourth Amendment requires a warrant for the type of cell-
phone data present here, exclusion of that information was 
not required because it was collected in good faith.”); United 
States v. Chambers, No. 16-163-CR, 2018 WL 4523607, at 
*3 (2d Cir. Sept. 21, 2018) (“Thus, we conclude that even 
after Jones, but before Carpenter, it was objectively 
reasonable for authorities to think that if they complied with 
the SCA, no warrant based on probable cause was 
constitutionally required to obtain cell-site information from a 
third party.”).  Judge Restrepo’s concurrence in Stimler also 
concluded that the good faith exception applied here in light 
of In re Application.  See Stimler, 864 F.3d at 279-80 
(Restrepo, J., concurring).  
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Amendment.29  But, under Davis, only binding appellate 
precedent is relevant to the good faith exception, and In re 
Application was binding in this Circuit at the time.  Second, 
he contends the government could not have reasonably relied 
on In re Application because it had been undermined by two 
subsequent Supreme Court cases—United States v. Jones30 
and Riley v. California.31  As discussed in Stimler, neither 
case undercuts In re Application because neither addresses 
the long-term collection of metadata from cell phones.32  
Jones addressed long-term collection of GPS location data 
from a car—not a cell phone.33  Riley involved the contents of 
a cell phone, not the metadata transmitted from a cell phone 
to a third party.34  Indeed, Carpenter itself recognizes that the 
collection of CSLI does “not fit neatly under existing 
                                              
29 See Appellant’s Supplemental Letter at 3-4.  The case that 
Goldstein refers to was reversed on rehearing and upheld the 
constitutionality of CSLI obtained on less than probable 
cause.  See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513 (11th 
Cir. 2015). 
30 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (holding that placing a GPS tracker on 
a defendant’s car for 28 days without a warrant violated the 
Fourth Amendment).  
31 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (holding that a warrantless search of 
the contents of a cell phone violated Fourth Amendment).  
32 Stimler, 864 F.3d at 264-67.  
33 Jones, 565 U.S. at 412-13.  Carpenter explains that cars 
cannot be analogized to cell phones in this context because 
cell phones can provide law enforcement with more 
information than a car about an individual’s movements.  
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.    
34 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494-95.  
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precedents.”35  The government could not have predicted the 
outcome of Carpenter and the overruling of In re Application 
from two Supreme Court cases that the Supreme Court itself 
said are not directly applicable.  
 
Goldstein also argues that the good faith exception 
applies only to police officers and other investigators, not the 
government attorneys who obtained the Section 2703(d) order 
here.  Goldstein cites nothing in support of his proposed 
limitation on the good faith exception, and we see no reason 
to limit its applicability in this case.  The relevant inquiry 
here is not who the state actor is, but rather, whether the state 
actor had a reasonable, good faith belief that his actions were 
legal.  The prosecutors relied on a then-valid statute whose 
constitutionality had been confirmed by this Circuit.  The 




 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court’s 
denial of Goldstein’s motion to suppress.     
                                              
35 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214-16. 
